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Abstract
Responding to the euro crisis, European leaders have put in place an enhanced eco-
nomic and financial governance framework for the euro area, including the main 
pillars of a banking union, while they have initiated work on a capital markets union. 
This should more effectively secure sound national macroeconomic and fiscal 
 policies, a healthy financial sector and the stability of the euro. This paper poses the 
question whether the status quo of half-way political integration is sufficient to safe-
guard the cohesion and integrity of the euro area. National governments still have 
considerable leeway to circumvent the “hard” budget constraint and the strong 
 market competition implied by the euro area’s “holy trinity” (one market, one 
 currency and one monetary policy). For example, they might target captive sover-
eign debt markets or take protectionist measures. This economic nationalism would 
entrench the crisis-related fragmentation of the single market and frustrate the 
 efficient functioning of the monetary union. A higher level of market-preserving 
fiscal federalism could prevent member countries from encroaching on markets and 
foster sustainable economic convergence towards an optimal currency area.
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“The recent crisis has shown that there remains a strong temptation, particularly 
when times are hard, to roll back the Single Market and seek refuge in forms of 
 economic nationalism.” 
(Barroso in his mission letter to Monti, 2010)
1 Introduction
From mid-2007 to mid-2012, the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
successively saw a financial crisis, economic crisis and sovereign debt crisis, which 
threatened the very existence of the euro (Mongelli and van Riet, 2013). Responding 
to this triple crisis, European leaders have undertaken many important reforms to 
strengthen the institutional architecture of EMU, also giving up national authority 
over banking supervision and resolution. As a result, the euro area has entered a 
new era with a substantially upgraded economic and financial governance frame-
work for preventing and resolving new crises (Mongelli, 2013). They nevertheless 
decided to hold on to national sovereignty in macroeconomic and fiscal policies. 
The question this paper poses is whether this half-way euro area political inte-
gration, staying within the boundaries of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, is sufficient to 
secure the cohesion and integrity of a monetary union in which economic freedom 
and market pressure are foreseen to drive the process of convergence towards an 
optimal currency zone. The risk it identifies is that member countries may use their 
remaining leeway to suppress the free functioning of the single market and free-ride 
on the euro in order to relax their “hard” budget constraint and protect domestic 
banks and industries. Such economic nationalism would entrench the market frag-
mentation observed since the euro crisis and frustrate the efficient functioning of 
EMU. This risk highlights the need for appropriate supranational institutions to en-
sure that euro area countries observe sound fiscal policies and that “mercantile 
competition” between them in a common market without barriers is welfare- 
enhancing rather than destructive. The corresponding analysis in this paper builds 
on the requirements for “market-preserving fiscal federalism” which McKinnon 
(1995, 1997) discussed for the American Monetary Union in comparison with 
 Europe. 
The Member States of the European Union (EU) introduced the euro as a politi-
cal response to the “monetary policy trilemma” which in international economics is 
also known as the “impossible trinity” facing an open economy. This trilemma 
states that for countries wishing to embark on financial globalisation the triplet of 
perfect capital mobility, fixed exchange rates and an autonomous monetary policy is 
not feasible: they need to drop one of the three elements of this “holy trinity” (as 
Rose, 1996, called it). Accepting the liberalisation of international capital flows 
 after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system, advanced econo-
mies have generally preferred two-corner solutions to this trilemma, adopting either 
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fixed or floating exchange rate regimes and the associated opposite implications for 
their monetary policy autonomy (White, 2013). Europe followed a different road. 
Creating a monetary union allowed the participating nations to uniquely occupy all 
three corners of the monetary triangle and to enjoy the benefits of a “holy trinity” 
inside the euro area: a single market, a single currency and a single monetary policy. 
A combination of market forces and common rules of behaviour was expected to 
impose policy discipline, as a precondition for both economic convergence and euro 
area stability, which in turn would bring greater prosperity. 
From the outset it was clear that the euro area was not an optimum currency area 
(Jager and Hafner, 2013; Mongelli, 2013). Moreover, as became evident during the 
euro crisis, the theory of optimum currency areas as formulated in the mid-20th cen-
tury was silent about the implications of financial liberalisation, the need for a bank-
ing union and the specific political requirements of creating a monetary union in 
Europe (Eichengreen, 2014). Many member countries were ill-prepared for the 
opening up of markets inside the EU, the economic consequences of adopting the 
euro, and the coincident globalisation of trade and finance, which increased compe-
tition both inside and outside EMU. At the same time, they had given up their old 
(imperfect) instruments of currency devaluation and inflation to rebalance the 
 domestic economy and correct current account deficits. In addition, the active use of 
industrial policies to protect domestic sectors was constrained by EU rules govern-
ing the single market and state aid (Bastasin, 2012).
According to McKinnon (1995, pp. 463, 477), the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and 
its push for a single currency was a “leap in the dark”. This was true especially for 
the EU Member States with a high public debt. Given open capital markets, in his 
view, these countries required continued national sovereign control over their cur-
rency and their central bank in order to be able to limit capital outflows, devalue the 
currency and/or use monetary financing of budget deficits so as to prevent  financial 
crises in times of fiscal stress (or to use these policy options during episodes when 
bank rescue operations strained fiscal resources). With the irrevocable adoption of 
the euro they once and for all relinquished the option of using inflation and/or 
 devaluation as a last resort to deal with a public debt overhang – also knowing that 
a supranational replacement in the form of an effective crisis management system 
was not available, since this “was regarded as superfluous” (Thygesen, 2013, p. 28). 
Hence, euro area countries in principle faced a “hard budget constraint” (McKinnon, 
1995, 1997) and a government default became the only way to resolve a fiscal crisis 
(Sims, 2012), even though a formal sovereign bankruptcy procedure did not exist. 
This EMU architecture implied that the participating countries were bound to 
observe sound macroeconomic, fiscal and financial policies, both in their own inter-
est and in that of the euro area as a whole. They would need to work hard to increase 
their economic flexibility, fiscal strength and financial resilience in order to absorb 
asymmetric shocks and deal with spill-over effects in an integrating currency area 
104 WORKSHOP NO. 21
Market-preserving fiscal federalism in the European Monetary Union
that moreover operated in an increasingly competitive global economic environ-
ment. As it turned out, the governance model of the euro area was subject to a 
 “systemic failure” (De Streel, 2013, p. 337). Governments in practice faced only 
weak market incentives, soft peer pressure and no enforcement to maintain 
 competitive economies, sound public finances and healthy financial sectors. On the 
contrary, their incentives were misaligned towards preserving economic policy au-
tonomy and pursuing “mercantile” strategies favouring national rather than com-
mon euro area interests (see also Bastasin, 2012). Harmful “mercantile competition” 
(cf. Hayek, 1939; McKinnon, 1995) was widespread in Europe in the decades before 
the single market and the single currency were established, inter alia with the 
 purpose to overcome this source of fragmentation. There are indications that eco-
nomic nationalism has ever since remained a (hidden) force of divergence  between 
the euro area countries and that it intensified during the triple crisis. From 1999-
2014 there was in any case no convergence of real GDP per capita between the first 
12 euro area members (European Central Bank, 2015) 
Recent studies have examined the scope for trade-offs between the two-corner 
solutions given by the monetary policy trilemma and how countries could adopt 
 intermediate policy strategies in order to “round the corners” for some time (see 
Klein and Shambaugh, 2013). For example, advanced economies concerned about 
competitive devaluations in a global context of ultra-easy monetary policies could 
be tempted to apply administrative instruments, such as capital restrictions and 
 financial repression, in order to insulate themselves and regain a degree of policy 
autonomy (White, 2013). All over the world central banks, regulators and govern-
ments appear to be resorting more frequently to national financial sector policies 
with the characteristics of financial protectionism in order to manage volatile  capital 
flows and financial fragilities (Beck et al., 2015). Many nations have further taken 
recourse to outright trade restrictions or “murky” forms of beggar-thy-neighbour 
policies that are difficult to detect, despite the commitment of G20 leaders to resist 
all forms of protectionism and keep markets open (Evenett, 2014). 
The euro area is no exception to this global trend of policy makers trying to 
 reclaim room for manoeuvre in fields where it had been lost. Many member coun-
tries looked for national safeguards against macroeconomic, fiscal and financial 
instability and national policy levers that could “round the corners” of the monetary 
triangle inside EMU. As the financial crisis struck, governments had to convince 
markets that they were strong enough to carry the heavy budgetary burden of the 
bank rescue operations and the Great Recession and hence that their bonds were still 
safe, also in the face of contagion by weakened member states. Foreign creditors 
were quick to withdraw their capital from those countries where adverse shocks led 
to a crisis of confidence in the stability of the banking system, the prospects for a 
durable economic recovery and the sustainability of public finances. Seeking a way 
to respond to the crisis, countries in distress considered their participation in the 
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euro a “strait-jacket” (Bastasin, 2012, p.158), as it left them with an “uncomfortably 
narrow” policy space (Crafts, 2013, p.713). As there was no supranational stabili-
sation and rescue mechanism to assist them and the Maastricht Treaty explicitly 
excluded a bail-out by partner countries, the financial sector, or the European 
 Central Bank (ECB), the countries concerned were in principle left to their own 
 devices to break the self-fulfilling default expectations. Hence, they had strong in-
centives to encroach on free markets by putting up barriers to competition, subsidis-
ing strategic firms, supporting banking champions, promoting captive sovereign 
debt markets and applying soft capital outflow restrictions (see also Bastasin, 2012; 
Véron, 2013; Crafts, 2014). While these policy interventions may reflect legitimate 
domestic stability concerns rather than protectionist intentions, they also had  serious 
negative side effects on economic and financial integration. 
An incomplete EMU characterised by fragmented authorities, policies and 
 markets, if sustained, raises serious questions about the long-term viability of the 
euro (see also Pisani-Ferry et al., 2012). Trade protectionism inside the euro area 
constrains cross-border competition for goods and services priced in the same 
 currency, which reduces opportunities for increasing firm efficiency and labour 
productivity. Facilitating the growth of national banking champions supports the 
build-up of leverage and systemic risk. Shielding public and private sector access to 
capital from market discipline promotes a bias towards debt-financed spending. 
 Financial market fragmentation frustrates cross-border credit intermediation, 
 hampers monetary transmission across the euro area and undermines the effective 
conduct of the single monetary policy. 
On balance, EMU is bound to move towards a more optimal currency area only 
when national leaders are willing to further expand their supranational arrange-
ments and adopt a higher level of market-preserving fiscal federalism, subject to 
adequate democratic control. This means that they should transfer sufficient inter-
vention powers to European institutions charged with the task to guarantee a free, 
open and stable market economy for the euro area and to ensure a “hard” govern-
ment budget constraint for member countries. EMU could well move further away 
from an optimal currency zone when they are unwilling to embark on this path. 
Creating a fiscal union in a next step would require care to preserve fiscal disci-
pline, as a powerful central government tends to enjoy a “soft” budget constraint 
and any budget transfers would extend this to the national level.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 looks into the implications for 
member countries of their participation in EMU and the role of the euro area’s “holy 
trinity” in imposing market-based discipline. Section 3 outlines the main reasons 
why – contrary to most expectations – market incentives for sovereigns were rela-
tively weak in the first 10 years of the euro. Section 4 reviews how some member 
countries attempted to restore national policy space after sovereign debt markets 
had turned vigilant again. One typical reaction was to introduce (hidden) barriers 
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inside the single market. Section 5 argues that a higher level of market-preserving 
fiscal federalism could remove the ability of member countries to encroach on free 
markets and align national policies with EMU requirements. Section 6 concludes 
that embarking on this path requires a social consensus about the limits of a 
 sovereign nation state in a monetary union and national ownership of the reforms 
necessary to underpin the viability of the euro.
2  The euro area’s “holy trinity” imposes market discipline
2.1 Economic policy constraints in an ever-closer union  
One may argue that the market-driven liberal economic regime underlying Euro-
pean monetary unification and EMU was derived from Hayek’s (1939) analysis of 
the by necessity limited scope for member state economic policies in an interstate 
federation. He stressed the importance for a political federation to have adequate 
restraining powers to prevent individual member states from interfering with the 
freedom of economic activity and causing a gradual disintegration of the common 
economic area. Hence, market liberalisation unavoidably meant a transfer of 
 sovereignty over economic policies to the federation and the establishment of an 
economic union.  
Moreover, the federal government would itself have to limit its powers of eco-
nomic planning and regulation to those activities which enhance the internal coher-
ence of the union and that are grounded in common convictions, ideals, values and 
traditions. While common economic interests and a sense of solidarity can usually 
be clearly defined for the citizens of a sovereign nation state, a political union tends 
to be characterised by diverse economic conditions and much weaker solidarity 
among its members. The more heterogeneous a federation is, the more complicated 
it will be to reach agreement on centralised interventions in economic life (such as 
protection from competition, subsidies for less developed regions, unemployment 
insurance and labour market regulations), because the benefits would only accrue to 
specific states, sectors or groups while the costs would be carried by the more 
 dynamic or prosperous other parts of the union. Consequently, “there would have to 
be less government all round if federation is to be practicable” (Hayek, 1939, reprint 
of 1948, p. 266). 
As pointed out by Hayek, this does not imply extreme laissez faire. But instead 
of continuously interfering with market forces, the federation’s economic policies 
should provide the framework within which individual initiatives can prosper and 
supply the common public goods and services that the market mechanism is unable 
to deliver.
The growing economic policy constraints in “an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe” (as foreseen since the Treaty of Rome of 1957) based on increas-
ing market liberalisation has triggered two opposite reactions. For some observers 
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the inability to use federal distributive policies to correct the social disparities and 
regional imbalances accompanying a free market economy is the reason to denounce 
the whole process of European unification and to reject the single currency. Given 
the diversity among the participating EU Member States, these euro sceptics favour 
instead the  freedom of sovereign states to intervene in markets and for example to 
use currency devaluation and other protectionist measures to tackle economic and 
social divergences. 
For other observers the solution is instead a deeper European integration. The 
euro area countries should share more of their sovereignty by attributing stronger 
economic intervention powers to the European institutions that could be employed 
to promote both economic and social progress as well as to address regional imbal-
ances. The historical heterogeneity of European economic cultures and traditions 
would in their view not stand in the way of erecting a supranational democratic 
 system – or even a European federation – that would legitimate such centralised 
market interventions.3
2.2 Solving the monetary policy trilemma
The introduction of the euro in 1999 was a political response to the monetary policy 
trilemma associated with the Mundell-Fleming model for an open economy. 
 According to this trilemma, a country wishing to maintain free capital movements 
as well as exchange rate stability cannot simultaneously pursue an autonomous 
monetary policy; as only two-corner solutions are possible, one of the three  elements 
of this “holy trinity” (Rose, 1996) has to be given up.  
For example, Germany combined an open capital market with monetary auton-
omy and hence accepted a floating currency (see chart 1, option A). By contrast, 
many of its European trade partners pegged their currencies (more or less tightly) to 
the Deutsche Mark, seeking to import the high credibility of the Bundesbank’s 
 monetary policy aimed at price stability (see chart 1, option B).
3 For an overview of this debate in Germany, notably between W. Streeck and J. Habermas, see 
Pistone (2013).
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Chart 1: The monetary policy trilemma
Note:  A country can occupy only two of the three corners and the line in between that connects 
them.
The founding members of the euro were keen to preserve exchange rate stability, 
reflecting a predominant post-war concern with avoiding trade distortions and 
 promoting trade integration (Wyplosz, 2000). The difficulty to maintain control 
over both monetary policy and the exchange rate in open financial markets moti-
vated them (after having experimented with exchange rate stabilisation systems 
since the mid-1970s) to join forces in order to occupy each of the three corners of the 
monetary triangle and realise a “holy trinity” inside the euro area: by complement-
ing the single market with a single currency and a single monetary policy they 
could henceforth all enjoy the benefits of a large and open internal market, irrevoca-
bly fixed bilateral exchange rates and a credible common anchor of price stability 
(chart 2).
While all euro area countries gave up their freedom of choice with regard to any of 
the three corners of the monetary policy trilemma, the pooling of national monetary 
sovereignty offered them the opportunity to mandate a common central bank to 
 independently preserve monetary stability for the euro area and to manage the euro 
as a floating currency in globalised markets (the setting depicted in chart 1, option 
A). By contrast, they decided to retain their national sovereignty in other policy 
 areas (apart from trade and competition in the context of the single market).
Option A: Floating currency Option B: Monetary dependence 
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Chart 2: The “holy trinity” of the euro area
Note:  Euro area countries together occupied all three corners of the monetary triangle and thus 
each one of them enjoys open internal markets, irrevocably fixed bilateral exchange rates 
and a credible common anchor of price stability.
This is a unique configuration, as in monetary history a currency was always 
aligned with a state. On the one hand, the “deep pockets” of the state made it easier 
to protect the value of the currency in the interests of the economy; on the other 
hand, the sovereign could then also abuse the currency by debasing its value in order 
to lower the burden of public debt (see Goodhart, 1998; van Riet, 2015). EMU was 
to be different. All countries that adopted the euro could expect substantial benefits 
from economic actors being able to access one wide market with one stable  currency 
and to diversify portfolio risks. However, as a denationalised currency managed by 
a depoliticised common central bank, the euro was not meant to offer a protective 
“shield” against market discipline. On the contrary, based on “the principle of indi-
vidual responsibility” (Weidmann, 2014), all euro area countries were themselves 
presumed to create the conditions for a dynamic economy, sustainable public 
 finances and a stable financial system. The pursuit of prudent national policies was 
moreover vital for the entire euro area, as deeper integration also meant a growing 
exposure to shocks in other member countries and to systemic financial risk. This 
constellation leads to the conclusion that all euro area authorities shared a common 
responsibility for the cohesion and stability of the single currency.
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2.3 Market-based discipline and rules-based discipline
This EMU architecture in principle left the challenge of countering asymmetric 
shocks and of dealing with a potential crisis to the national authorities. McKinnon 
(1995) warned that in particular EU countries with a large public debt overhang 
would be better off keeping their own currency and central bank, because life in 
EMU would be too costly for them. McCauley and White (1997) cautioned that the 
over-investment of European banks and pension funds in domestic government 
bonds exposed them to rising sovereign credit risk and could trigger financial insta-
bility. Countries with weak public finances also lacked the fiscal capacity to deal 
with a systemic banking crisis. High-debt countries might therefore need to devalue 
their currency to secure (temporary) economic gains or exploit their central bank to 
secure market liquidity, low real interest rates and inflation tax revenues in order to 
address a fiscal breakdown and limit a financial crisis; they might also have to  retain 
exchange controls on capital flows so as to be able to sustain financial repression 
revenues.
During the transition towards the euro two divergent views were expressed on 
the nature of this challenge (Issing, 2008). The so-called “economists” argued that 
deeper economic integration was necessary – as implied by the theory of optimum 
currency areas – before the euro could be introduced in a final step. This view 
 resulted in economic convergence criteria, laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, 
which prospective members had to meet on a sustainable basis before being able to 
adopt the single currency. Low inflation and a sound fiscal position as reflected in 
low government bond yields and a stable exchange rate featured high among the 
nominal convergence requirements. An independent national central bank was also 
part of the entry criteria.
By contrast, the so-called “monetarists” thought that the creation of a single 
currency would itself be sufficient to enforce the economic adjustments that would 
make the euro an optimal currency zone. This view placed great trust in market 
 discipline as an endogenous driving force for the sound fiscal policies and structural 
reforms necessary for successful participation in EMU, supported by the many 
 institutional changes – not least the establishment of an independent European 
 Central Bank – that would accompany the introduction of the euro. 
The Maastricht Treaty required the Member States and the EU to act in accor-
dance with the principles of an open market economy with free competition. As in 
the end Member States were unwilling to sacrifice their political autonomy in the 
field of economic policy, the final EMU agreement lacked a strong supranational 
mechanism for promoting structural economic adjustment once countries had 
 renounced their  monetary and exchange rate policies. This also reflected confidence 
in the virtuous  influence of a competitive market economy operating under a single 
currency as the “Trojan horse” for supply-side flexibility (Dyson and Featherstone, 
1999, p. 784). In practice, Member States only had to engage in a non-binding coor-
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dination of their economic policies, as these were acknowledged to be a matter of 
common concern. Only in 2009, the Lisbon Treaty arranged that the euro area coun-
tries could decide to go much further in this respect, in order to ensure the proper 
functioning of EMU. 
The Maastricht Treaty entailed more binding arrangements for national fiscal 
policies, on top of the fiscal discipline expected from market forces. A privileged 
access of the public sector to the funds of financial institutions (other than for 
 prudential purposes) was prohibited. The legal independence assigned to the ECB 
in the conduct of monetary policy and its statutory focus on price stability secured 
the ban on monetary financing of governments (making an exception for supplying 
central-bank reserves to public credit institutions in order to treat them the same as 
private banks). Moreover, the “no bail-out” rule forbid EU Member States to take 
over each other’s commitments and the same prohibition applied to the EU institu-
tions. This was to avoid entering into a transfer union, whereby wealthier member 
countries could be called upon to support their weaker partners by equalisation 
 payments (Issing, 2008). 
These legal provisions ensured that governments must fund their debt in the 
open capital market, compete for savings in a way that supports an efficient alloca-
tion of funds and spend their resources for productive investments that enhance eco-
nomic performance and competitiveness (cf. McKinnon, 1997). One could argue 
that subjecting national policy makers to the powers of the market mechanism was 
one of the normative objectives of EMU, namely to prevent that unsound national 
actions could destabilise the single currency (Goodhart, 1998). Governments were 
thus well-advised to generate positive market expectations about their creditworthi-
ness by building confidence in their stability-oriented fiscal policies, the quality of 
prudential regulation and supervision and the economic performance of their coun-
try. This should enable both the public and private sectors to borrow at affordable, 
market-determined (real) interest rates and firms to attract equity capital at attrac-
tive conditions from international investors.
Governors of European central banks were aware, well before the Maastricht 
Treaty was concluded, that market discipline may at times be ineffective. The  Delors 
Report had highlighted that free access to a large capital market facilitates the 
 financing of budget imbalances and “the constraints imposed by market forces 
might either be too slow and weak or too sudden and disruptive” (Committee for the 
study of economic and monetary union, 1989, p. 24). As documented by James 
(2012, p. 297), when drafting the Statute of the ECB in 1990/91, governors also 
 realised that public entities could still enjoy a privileged access to financial markets 
as a result of national fiscal, banking and prudential regulation. They were further-
more aware that market participants could expect that euro area governments will 
ultimately be bailed out by their partner countries when encountering funding 
 difficulties – and that these governments could expect the same, leading to moral 
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hazard. As a result, markets would not set the correct interest rate on public debt. 
Hence, governors were sceptical that market discipline would be sufficient to avoid 
excessive budget deficits and feared that the ECB could then become subject to 
 political pressure to pursue a more accommodating monetary policy and to bail out 
high-debt member countries. 
Such doubts about the effectiveness of market constraints motivated the intro-
duction of EU fiscal rules and surveillance in the Maastricht Treaty as additional 
safeguards against excessive budget deficits and too high public debt. The impor-
tance of coordinating national fiscal policies and of concerted budgetary discipline 
– needed to prevent adverse interest rate spill-overs of fiscal laxity on other member 
countries, protect the credibility of the ECB’s monetary policy and guarantee a 
 balanced policy mix – motivated further detailed fiscal policy provisions, which 
were laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact of 1997 (Artis and Winkler, 1998). 
At the same time, the European Commission initiated a comprehensive action 
plan to complete the single market for financial services, enhance EU prudential 
legislation and strengthen coordination among the national supervisory authorities. 
This set of legal measures aimed at enhancing market efficiency and a healthy 
 financial sector while offering a precaution against potential market instability that 
could be triggered by troubled financial institutions.
3 Constrained market discipline over national fiscal policies
3.1 The “hard” budget constraint on euro area sovereigns 
Already in the run-up to EMU many prospective euro area countries gave their 
 national central banks an independent mandate to maintain price stability and 
sought to stabilise their exchange rate vis-à-vis other currencies (above all the 
Deutsche Mark) that participated in the exchange rate mechanism while opening up 
their capital markets (see for example Eijffinger and de Haan, 2000). The choice to 
give up political control over monetary and exchange rate policy became irrevocable 
with the adoption of the euro. This made their new position comparable to that of 
subsidiary governments like the American States, and that of developing countries 
faced with low market confidence in their national currency; i.e. they were all  unable 
to issue bonds in a currency under their own monetary control (McKinnon, 1997; 
Goodhart, 1998). Euro area countries however remained fully responsible for their 
own public finances as there was no central fiscal authority that could levy taxes, 
make transfer payments, absorb asymmetric shocks, rescue banks or pool their 
 sovereign debt.
As a consequence, euro area countries replaced a “soft” for a “hard” budget 
 constraint that once and for all ruled out the options of devaluation and inflation and 
excluded a bail-out by other member countries or EU institutions to deal with 
 episodes of severe fiscal stress. The regime change was much smaller for “safe 
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 haven” countries accustomed to open capital and product markets and with a history 
of central bank independence and successful stability-oriented policies; it was more 
significant for those EU-Member States with a tradition of protected markets and 
the reputation of monetary financing of high public deficits and regular currency 
devaluations. Especially for the latter group of countries the changeover to the euro 
raised the default risk on national public debt.4
The market funding of euro area governments became thus dependent on the 
willingness of international investors to roll over the already accumulated sovereign 
debt that, henceforth, to a smaller or larger extent was characterised by a higher risk 
profile (McCauley and While, 1997; Arnold and Lemmen, 2001; Gros, 2012). One 
might have expected that market interest rates would shift upwards for many euro 
area countries to reflect the apparent higher sovereign default risk, with the most 
indebted governments seeing the largest increase. Several factors worked against 
this plausible expectation, contributing to a downward convergence of government 
bond yields – a process that started well before the euro was introduced in 1999 
(chart 3) – instead of leading to persistent interest rate spreads reflecting disparate 
country fundamentals.
4 The pre-EMU distinction between sovereign credit ratings for domestic currency debt and 
those for foreign currency debt disappeared. While Standard & Poor’s unified the ratings of 
euro area countries on the (in several cases lower) foreign currency ratings to reflect the fact 
that they could no longer turn on the “printing press”, Moody’s by contrast used the domestic 
currency ratings as the new basis arguing that governments had already given up this option 
by granting their central banks independence.
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Chart 3: Government bond yields in the euro area countries
daily data, in percentages
Sources: Datastream and ECB.
Note: Chart excludes Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia, Slovakia and the Baltic countries.
3.2 A new environment for public debt management 
One factor was a more professional sovereign debt management in response to the 
liberalisation of capital markets and the institution of independent central banks. 
Many European countries had established public debt management offices with 
 operational autonomy in the 1990s, working under specific guidelines from the 
 finance ministry. Their task was in fact to provide the government with a form of 
insurance against market power (Dyson, 2014, p. 381). 
The activities of public debt managers generally focused on promoting a liquid 
government bond market, minimising borrowing costs at a prudent level of risk and 
supporting a more efficient asset and liability management of the public sector. 
They cooperated closely with primary dealers, a selective group of both domestic 
and foreign banks, which in return for certain privileges had the task to facilitate the 
placement of government securities in the open capital market.  
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Another factor contributing to the convergence of sovereign bond yields was the 
positive effect of a country adopting the euro and anchoring itself to a stability 
union. The ECB’s credible guarantee of price stability made it possible for public 
debt managers to issue more longer-maturity bonds than previously, thereby reduc-
ing roll-over risk. These debt securities also attracted demand from long-term 
 investors residing elsewhere in the euro area, using the new opportunity to diversify 
their country risk without in parallel having to accept exchange rate risk (see 
 McKinnon, 2002).  
Moreover, EU banking legislation allowed national supervisors to assign a very 
low or even zero risk weight to bank claims on the central government, also when 
these originated from other OECD countries. While before 1999 exchange rate risk 
still acted as a barrier, after the inception of the euro banks could make full use of 
the opportunity to buy government bonds of other participating countries without 
having to worry about extra capital charges for lower-rated sovereigns. Government 
bonds were furthermore exempted from the large exposure limit that applied to 
 private assets on bank balance sheets (McCauley and White, 1997; Arnold and 
Lemmen, 2001). EU prudential legislation entailed similar sovereign exposure 
 privileges for institutional investors. With the introduction of the euro, regulatory 
requirements to match the currency of their assets and liabilities allowed them to 
expand their domestic government bond portfolios to sovereign issuers from the 
whole euro area. 
The preferential regulatory treatment of public relative to private sector claims 
may have led market participants to believe that, no matter the amount purchased, 
government debt was virtually risk-free. They may have felt reassured by the 
 convergence of fiscal positions in the transition to EMU, the agreement on the 
 Stability and Growth Pact and the possibility laid down in the Maastricht Treaty to 
impose sanctions on Member States with persistent excessive deficits. Even if 
 imperfect, it arranged for EU surveillance of national fiscal policies and it targeted 
sound public finances. 
For turbulent times, market actors may have counted on a bail-out of troubled 
member countries, given the dangers of contagion in an integrated capital market 
and the presumption that EU institutions, the ECB and euro area partners would 
have little choice but to step in with supporting measures so as to ensure financial 
stability and preserve the euro (McKinnon, 1995; den Butter and Segers, 2014). This 
bail-out expectation may also explain the significant “bonus” that appeared in the 
sovereign credit ratings of EU Member States upon joining the euro, given the 
 evidence that until 2010 their euro-denominated debt was treated more favourably 
than the national-currency debt of other OECD countries (Körner and Trautwein, 
2015).
Once the euro was in place, banks and other financial institutions thus had  every 
incentive to accumulate government securities on their balance sheets and to select 
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in particular the higher-yielding bonds of those euro area countries that were priced 
in the market as being subject to higher credit and liquidity risk. As these bonds 
could now be purchased without currency risk, market participants started a “search 
for yield” – also driven by a global “savings glut” – that resulted in a general com-
pression of sovereign bond yields, bringing them close to the low levels of the safest 
member countries (chart 3).5 As reported by Weidmann (2014), over the period 
1999–2007, the average yield spread on the sovereign bonds of EMU countries 
 relative to the German Bund was just 14 basis points.
With the benefit of hindsight, the government debt of several euro area coun-
tries was significantly over-rated and the associated credit risk was systematically 
under-priced before the financial crisis. The view that markets would tolerate a 
lower public debt than before EMU and discipline national fiscal policies was 
 refuted by reality. For the previous high-interest rate countries the adoption of the 
euro in fact relaxed budget constraints rather than tightening them, as it made them 
an attractive target for yield-hungry investors, thereby creating moral hazard. 
 However, market pressure returned with a vengeance following the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
4 Rounding the corners of the euro area’s monetary triangle 
4.1 Countering self-fulfilling default expectations
When a new Greek government took office in October 2009 it surprised markets by 
disclosing much higher deficit and debt figures than were known before. Growing 
market concerns about the sustainability of public finances in Greece also affected 
other exposed euro area countries with a high public and/or private debt, a fragile 
banking sector and a poor economic outlook. The sudden shift in market sentiment 
towards these vulnerable members, especially among foreign creditors, caused a 
rapid increase in their sovereign bond yields as default risk premia were adjusted 
upwards, in conjunction with falling credit ratings and cross-border contagion 
 effects (chart 3). By contrast, Germany and other euro area countries with a “safe 
haven” status benefitted from “flight to safety and liquidity” flows and enjoyed 
 falling government bond yields. This experience showed that only after the onset of 
the sovereign debt crisis, when credit rating agencies repeatedly downgraded 
 vulnerable countries, markets fully recognised again the fundamental default risk 
attached to subsidiary governments that should have been evident from the start of 
5 Buiter and Sibert (2005) argue that this market failure was also partly due to the fact that the 
Eurosystem allocated all euro-denominated central government securities in the highest 
 liquidity category without regard to differences in the market’s valuation of default risk. 
 Although of relatively minor significance, this artificial liquidity enhancement could have 
suppressed government bond yields of weak euro area sovereigns.        
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EMU. Several hedge funds even started to take speculative positions against the 
euro. Not surprisingly, this was also reflected by a “malus” appearing in the sover-
eign credit ratings of vulnerable euro area countries as compared to other OECD 
members (Körner and Trautwein, 2015).
The spreading of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area closely corresponded 
to what Kaminsky et al. (2003) describe as the “unholy trinity of financial conta-
gion” in the context of sudden stops in foreign funding: a surprise negative 
 announcement sets off a broad-based reversal of capital inflows as leveraged com-
mon creditors reduce their exposure to the sovereign as well as to private borrowers 
perceived to be vulnerable. The mirror image of the euro area’s “holy trinity” in 
tranquil times was the “unholy trinity” facing troubled members: excluding infla-
tion, devaluation and a bail-out was incompatible with avoiding a sovereign default; 
at least one “safety valve” for sovereigns under market stress had to be found, as a 
self-fulfilling default was not only costly but also contagious and endangered the 
cohesion and integrity of the euro area.
As a solution, the EU institutions and euro area leaders committed to do what-
ever was required to secure financial stability in the euro area as a whole (see van 
Riet, 2015). Responding to the sovereign debt  crisis they created new fiscal back-
stop mechanisms subject to strict policy conditions to support member countries 
that temporarily had lost access to the capital market. Separately, the ECB initiated 
temporary and limited purchases of their  government bonds – the monetary impact 
of which was sterilised – to repair the fragmenting securities markets and restore an 
even monetary transmission across the euro area. At the peak of the crisis in mid-
2012, as sovereign bond yields  appeared to include a currency redenomination risk 
premium, the ECB made a credible commitment to undertake conditional but 
 unlimited outright purchases of government debt securities within the scope of its 
monetary policy mandate, which was successful in removing market uncertainty 
about a possible break-up of the euro. 
The national authorities on their part looked for (additional) solutions that would 
buy them time for undertaking the necessary policy reforms and potentially as a 
more permanent arrangement for easing the severe market pressure. Their own 
 pre-EMU experiences with actively trying to use domestic financial and industrial 
policies in the presence of currency pegs may have offered them inspiration 
(cf. Wyplosz, 2000).   
4.2 Reducing national policy constraints inside the euro area 
As already mentioned, theory suggests that countries can only occupy two of the 
three corners of the monetary policy trilemma and have to give up their autonomy 
over the third (chart 1). This impossible trinity can be extended to an “impossible 
quartet” when free trade is added. Historical analysis largely confirms that the 
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 monetary policy trilemma holds in the longer run and is a useful guidepost for 
 policy makers (Obstfeld et al., 2005). However, recent studies suggest that there may 
be scope for intermediate policy choices that – using the words of Klein and 
 Shambaugh (2013) – “round the corners” of the monetary policy trilemma and allow 
some time-bound room for manoeuvre to tackle specific national policy dilemma’s. 
The policy options that address the various trade-offs in responding to significant 
shocks include for example trade protectionism to create artificial competitive 
 advantages in interconnected product markets, selective capital market restrictions 
to address financial fragility concerns, macroprudential measures to better control 
domestic credit growth, soft currency pegs to gain some autonomy over domestic 
monetary conditions, and management of floating exchange rates to limit harmful 
currency volatility (chart 4). The appropriateness, feasibility and effectiveness of 
such “middle-of-the-road” policies are widely debated.
 
Chart 4: Rounding the corners of the monetary policy trilemma
Note:  A country that occupies two of the three corners and the line in between that connects them 
can still achieve some extra room for manoeuvre on the implied policy constraint if it is able to 
“round”the third corner.
Countries in the euro area have similar incentives to exploit the scope for trade-offs 
in an integrated single market with a single currency and a single monetary policy 
in order to restore some margin for national policy manoeuvre (Blundell-Wignall 
et al., 2013; Crafts, 2014). The possible tools that would “round the corners” of the 
euro area’s monetary triangle include quasi-fiscal, regulatory, prudential, exchange 
rate, trade and industrial policies. They could be adopted both to prevent and  manage 
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domestic imbalances inside the euro area as well as to respond to asymmetric 
shocks. During a crisis, participating countries may in particular look for national 
stabilisation tools that make it easier for them to tackle market turbulence, fiscal 
distress, and economic adjustment (chart 5). 
Chart 5: Rounding the corners of the euro area’s monetary triangle
Note:  Euro area countries may “round” all three corners of the monetary triangle by trying to relax 
the constraints implied by open internal markets, irrevocably fixed bilateral exchange rates, 
and a single monetary policy stance.
For example, (coordinated) national macroprudential policies (such as changes in 
the required counter-cyclical capital buffer or the maximum loan-to-value ratio), 
could be used to counter heterogeneous business and financial cycles within EMU, 
where the single monetary policy is unable to prevent or address these in the  member 
countries (Houben and Kakes, 2013; Herzberg and Watson, 2014). To assist a rebal-
ancing of current account positions, some authors propose a fiscal devaluation as a 
national substitute to the inability of euro area countries to devalue (Keen and de 
Mooij, 2012). This policy reduces the relative cost of tradables through a shift in the 
tax base away from capital taxation and social contributions on labour to taxes on 
consumption or property. A radical suggestion to regain room for exchange rate ma-
noeuvre is to introduce for some time a parallel currency in distressed countries 
which could fluctuate against the euro (Richter et al., 2013).  
Constraining the free functioning of the single market could also gain momen-
tum. To ease competitive pressures, governments may continue to shield the provi-
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sion of services from foreign competition, provide state aid to favoured sectors, or 
impose administrative requirements that amount to trade protectionism in disguise. 
They may also be tempted to place restrictions on foreign take-overs of strategic 
firms and put up barriers to labour mobility within the EU. Bastasin (2012) reports 
in this respect that in the wake of the financial crisis several euro area countries 
 protected their banks in order to prevent that they could become an easy prey to 
 foreign acquisitions. Some also gave state subsidies or loans at concessional interest 
rates to their car industries.
Various suggestions have also been made for a more “effective management of 
capital flows” (see the policy agenda proposed by Lane, 2013, pp. 16 ff.). National 
policy makers may apply a range of financial sector policies as a tool to restrict 
cross-border capital movements and create more space to address domestic policy 
challenges stemming from volatile capital flows and tight financial conditions 
(Beck et al., 2015). During the sovereign debt crisis, the public debt managers of 
vulnerable euro area countries generally sought an insurance against rising market 
expectations of sovereign default (Dyson, 2014, p. 383; van Riet, 2014). This appar-
ently took the form of inducing resident investors, in particular banks, pension 
funds and insurance corporations, to buy and hold more bonds issued by their own 
sovereign (see also Bastasin, 2012; Reinhart, 2012). Some euro area countries also 
used their fiscal capacity to enable weakened domestic banks to expand their role as 
major investors in government bonds and thereby to counter the risk of capital flight 
causing a sharp increase in their own borrowing costs (Valiante, 2014). 
With the same effect, Koo (2012) proposes to agree at the euro area level to limit 
the sale of government bonds to citizens and exclude foreigners, while leaving 
 investments in private sector financial assets free for non-residents. He sees this 
“nationals-only rule” as an alternative to a fiscal union, which could enable the 
 government to run more flexible fiscal policies to fight a recession, as domestic 
creditors could be more likely to accept the necessary higher budget deficits. The 
key advantage of such a more captive domestic investor base is that it reduces the 
fiscal vulnerabilities from having a large and less stable foreign community of 
 government bond holders, albeit at the price of crowding out local private invest-
ment and preventing domestic creditors from spreading their risks across a wider 
range of assets (van Riet, 2013).
Another example of financial protectionism is that national supervisors report-
edly placed restrictions on the outflow of bank capital and liquidity, while demand-
ing repatriation of assets held abroad, so as to ring-fence their domestic banking 
systems and secure credit supply for residents, including for the government (Véron, 
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2013).6 As an ultimate solution against a run on bank deposits and citizens moving 
their savings abroad, Cyprus had to impose administrative restrictions on bank 
transactions and capital outflow controls in March 2013 that were in force for just 
over two years. Greece faced the risk of a financial breakdown related to a possible 
exit from the euro in June 2015 and was forced to temporarily close its banks and 
the stock exchange while until further notice closing the border for capital exports. 
Substantial capital flight would also have complicated these governments’ future 
return to the capital market.
4.3 The fragmentation of the euro area 
Such “middle-of-the-road” policies reflect attempts by national authorities to relax 
the constraints associated with the “holy trinity” of the euro area and to reclaim 
some control over how the triplet of the single market, the single currency and the 
single monetary policy affects their own economies. Some of the aforementioned 
interventions are sensible, such as a (budget-neutral) fiscal devaluation to improve 
competitiveness or national macroprudential actions to deal with localised housing 
booms. A correction of capital market failures and improper incentives in the 
 financial industry that fuelled the external financing of a credit-driven boom in the 
crisis-hit countries is also warranted. The financial trilemma7 associated with the 
high degree of financial integration in EMU nevertheless demands that member 
countries coordinate national macroprudential actions and regulatory measures 
which affect cross-border capital flows and financial conditions across the euro area 
(see Herzberg and Watson, 2014). 
Some other crisis-related national policies, however, may be interpreted as a 
form of “mercantile competition” that is turning into market repression and protec-
tionism to ease economic adjustment, reduce fiscal stress and solve distributional 
issues (cf. Hayek, 1939; McKinnon, 1995; Rodrik, 2000 and 2011). Government 
 efforts to nurture the domestic banking and corporate sector or to introduce  “hidden” 
restrictions on cross-border capital flows contribute to a renationalisation of 
 markets, which could lead to growing economic and financial disintegration. The 
consequent fragmentation of the single market along national lines frustrates the 
6 This supervisory reaction appears to be a global phenomenon, leading to financial protectio-
nism and a “balkanisation” of banking (The Economist, 23 November 2013, pp. 18 and 74). 
Rose and Wieladek (2014) report evidence that nationalised banks and those benefiting from 
public sector support after the 2008 financial crisis reduced foreign lending to counterparts in 
the United Kingdom or charged them higher interest rates.
7 Following Schoenmaker (2011), the financial trilemma states that an effective management 
of domestic financial developments when there is full capital mobility is only feasible with 
international coordination.
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 efficient allocation of resources, distorts wage and price formation, constrains 
 monetary transmission and complicates the conduct of the single monetary policy. 
This in turn could oblige the ECB to take (further) non-standard measures for 
repairing the monetary transmission mechanism, also using special tools directed at 
dysfunctional national markets and economies starved of credit (see chart 5). In the 
same vein, several EU initiatives seek to promote the ability of capital  markets to 
mobilise non-bank long-term financing and to channel it across Europe to regions, 
sectors and SMEs that are short of bank funding (European Commission, 2014). 
The steps being taken towards a capital markets union offering equal access to 
funding and uniform creditor protection also go in the direction of countering 
 financial disintegration and fragmentation (European Commission, 2015). 
4.4  The revival of economic nationalism
Altogether there is a risk of euro area countries curtailing the single market and 
 returning to old-style industrial and directed credit policies for national benefit. 
Crafts (2014) sees the consequent retreat from economic and financial integration as 
a new political compromise to save the euro, comparable to the Bretton Woods 
 episode when most European countries applied capital controls while pegging the 
exchange rate to the US dollar and opening up for trade. These capital market 
 restrictions served in his view to preserve monetary policy autonomy and enabled 
countries to use financial repression as a national strategy to support public debt 
deleveraging and the build-up of a welfare state.8 
Similarly, Monnet et al. (2014) interpret the return of financial market restric-
tions as a reactivation of historical patterns of suasion, interaction and control that 
in many EU Member States characterised the relations between governments, their 
central bank and the domestic financial sector for decades after World War II until 
the changeover to EMU. The objective of such close relationships was to ease the 
government budget constraint, allocate credit to favoured sectors, conduct industrial 
policy and stabilise the economy. According to these observers, euro area countries 
facing  distress could again be allowed to use protectionist and repressive measures 
that  facilitate their economic and financial adjustment and reduce the pain of fiscal 
 consolidation. 
EU law permits, within limits, taking measures at the European or national level 
to support the proper functioning of markets, the soundness of financial institutions 
and the stability of the euro. However, these actions may also have undesirable “side 
effects” that distort incentives and undermine the ability of markets to impose disci-
8 Wyplosz (2000) explains the adherence to financial repression in post-war Europe with EU 
Member States’ commitment to stabilise their exchange rates, reflecting a predominant 
 concern with intra-area trade.
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pline on national policy makers (van Riet, 2013). Where they are aimed at repairing 
dysfunctional markets and institutions and at protecting countries against distorted 
economic and financial conditions, they may be characterised as stabilising. Where 
the interventions go beyond correcting market and regulatory failures and introduce 
new distortions, such as government funding privileges or state aid facilities for 
 national economic champions, they undermine the cohesion and integrity of EMU. 
Before the crisis, market discipline was weak and the ample availability of cheap 
financing created political incentives to free-ride on the euro and to delay reforms; 
following the crisis, the return of market vigilance made financing more expensive, 
which this time could fuel political incentives in favour of protectionist and repres-
sive measures that undermine the smooth functioning of the euro area. As the Euro-
pean Commission (2012, p. 10) warned: “More than 50 years after the foundation of 
the European Union the crisis of confidence appears to be reinstating the constrain-
ing power of national borders, questioning the Single Market and threatening the 
achievements and as yet unfulfilled aspirations of Economic and Monetary Union”.
4.5  Limits to national policy autonomy and common risk-sharing
Two relevant questions for EMU are therefore whether and to what extent continued 
national autonomy over key economic policy areas is compatible with building a 
more resilient and integrated euro area; and to what extent a common risk-sharing 
mechanism is at all feasible in a heterogeneous monetary union. 
The first issue can be illustrated by the fiscal/financial trilemma put forward by 
Obstfeld (2013): maintaining financial integration, financial stability and fiscal 
 autonomy are mutually incompatible in a context where the health of the banking 
sector and the creditworthiness of sovereigns are closely intertwined. One of the 
three desiderata has to give way and moving to some kind of fiscal union appears to 
him (and others) as the most logical choice.9 
Piketty (2014, p. 561) sees a fiscal union in this respect above all as an instru-
ment to ensure the effectiveness of financial restrictions in an open international 
capital market, as the risk of capital flight requires them to be introduced at the level 
9 Pisani-Ferry (2012) draws the same conclusion in favour of a fiscal union on the basis of the 
new impossible trinity of a national banking system connected to the sovereign, a strict ban 
on monetary financing and the rejection of co-responsibility for public debt. Beck and Prinz 
(2012) see a single monetary policy by an independent ECB and the no bailout clause as 
 mutually inconsistent with national fiscal sovereignty. The Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa-Group 
(2012) calls for a single currency area that combines the single market with a banking union 
and key elements of a fiscal union. Bindseil and Winkler (2014) argue that a monetary union 
like the euro area must have a strong underpinning by a banking and fiscal union in order for 
the common central bank to be able to deal with solvency issues that might arise when it 
fights a  liquidity crisis.   
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of the euro area: “When countries relinquish monetary sovereignty, it is essential to 
restore their fiscal sovereignty over matters no longer within the purview of the na-
tion-state, such as the interest rate on public debt, the progressive tax on capital, or 
the tax of multinational corporations.”   
Yet, the costs and benefits of moving to a fiscal union also depend on the role 
assigned to markets and institutions in ensuring budgetary discipline. McKinnon 
(1997) argues that a supranational fiscal authority in combination with a “hard” 
 budget constraint on euro area countries would put the latter in the position of 
 subsidiary sovereigns like American States. The concern he raises (both for the case 
of Europe and that of the United States) is that a supranational government in 
 principle faces a “soft” budget constraint, because the federal bonds that it issues 
will be perceived as “risk free” in the home capital market as long as it has (politi-
cal) influence over the common central bank. Under these circumstances federal 
bonds will be the preferred “safe” investment category and hence the supranational 
government faces little market discipline. To prevent the “federal leviathan” from 
building up too much debt, it would need to observe a balanced budget rule, possibly 
together with a constitutional agreement that federal taxes are to be used only for 
financing truly federal public goods and services.
Moreover, when the common fiscal capacity is used to make transfer payments 
to equalise economic conditions across the monetary union, the subsidiary sover-
eigns get indirect access to the common central bank and their own budget  constraint 
will soften accordingly. This benefit is of particular interest to the less fiscally 
 prudent members, who may even adopt strategies to exploit this channel. Bolton and 
Jeanne (2011, p.190) note in this respect that the wealthier EMU countries will have 
a strong interest in a form of fiscal integration which imposes as much budgetary 
discipline as possible, because in a fiscal union they could otherwise be forced to 
make continuous transfer payments to the weaker countries. 
Tirole (2015) believes that, in such an asymmetric situation, the healthy coun-
tries have no incentive to conclude joint-and-several liability arrangements. After a 
negative shock, they will only show solidarity to distressed members out of self- 
interest, in order to prevent being hit by contagion effects arising in an integrated 
monetary union, i.e. an environment in which imposing official sanctions is not 
very credible. Multilateral insurance is in his view only feasible in a symmetrical 
context where all members have a sound fiscal position, are equally exposed to 
shocks, face large spill-over effects and market-induced sanctions to over-borrow-
ing are credible. This in turn requires much more progress with real economic 
 convergence.   
The conclusion is that the cohesion and integrity of EMU may only be guaran-
teed if (new or existing) supranational public institutions receive sufficient interven-
tion powers to preserve market-based discipline as a complement to rule-based 
 pressure on member countries. This should promote more similar economic condi-
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tions and a more optimal currency zone. In addition, the possible creation of an 
area-wide fiscal authority should be embedded in an appropriate governance 
 structure to avoid opening the door to a new public debt bias. As a further  constraint, 
recalling Hayek (1939), a common fiscal policy in combination with common risk 
sharing and solidarity mechanisms must be grounded in common values and prefer-
ences among euro area citizens, or at least enjoy democratic legitimacy.
5 Benefits of market-preserving fiscal federalism for EMU
5.1 Political restrictions on discretionary economic policies
The ability of euro area countries to engage in harmful “mercantile competition” 
jeopardises EMU by moving it away from an optimum currency area. The question 
is therefore how in practice to counter such protectionist tendencies and how to 
 revive economic and financial integration in a political set-up where so far nation 
states have largely retained their sovereignty (as they have only transferred common 
tasks in the fields of trade and competition, monetary policy and banking super-
vision and resolution to European institutions with limited accountability to the Eu-
ropean Parliament). 
A possible answer lies in the observation by McKinnon (1995, 1997), Weingast 
(1995) and Qian and Weingast (1997) that a stable and welfare-enhancing monetary 
union needs “market-preserving (fiscal) federalism”. This amounts to a multi-level 
governance structure which secures free and open markets, promotes efficient 
 horizontal competition between the member countries and subjects all governments 
to a “hard” budget constraint (without privileged access to credit, the printing press 
or a bail-out) while providing financial stability safeguards against disruptive 
 market forces. To prevent that political forces encroach on markets, it places  credible 
restrictions on discretionary economic policy making – both at the national and 
 supranational level – and it simultaneously protects property rights and enforces 
contracts.10 
Against this background, taking inspiration from the criteria put forward by 
McKinnon (1995, 1997), Weingast (1995) and Montinola et al. (1995), one may 
 derive five main characteristics of market-preserving fiscal federalism that could 
govern the European Monetary Union: 
1.  There exists a clear hierarchy between area-wide (federal) authorities and 
 subsidiary authorities in which each level of government is autonomous in its 
10 Market-preserving fiscal federalism closely corresponds to what Enderlein (2009) calls 
“competitive fiscal federalism”. Among his three worlds of fiscal federalism, this type stands 
for a federation in which the federal government shares its power with sub-national entities 
that are responsible for financing their own policies and in which there is no requirement to 
equalise living conditions through transfer payments.   
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own jurisdiction and subject to democratic control; the allocation of their tasks 
and  responsibilities is durably institutionalised by a common political agree-
ment anchored in primary legislation.
2.  Area-wide (federal) institutions provide the common public goods and services 
that are essential for the efficacy and stability of the monetary union, notably 
a central judiciary to police the common market and enforce competition law and 
contracts, an integrated capital market with a single set of rules that ensure equal 
access to finance and offers equal creditor protection, a single monetary policy 
independent from political interference, a fully-fledged banking union, single 
supervision and resolution of non-bank financial institutions, a strong capacity 
for macroprudential interventions, a common sovereign bond that functions as 
anchor of the financial system, a common fiscal backstop as a fall-back for 
 subsidiary governments and ailing systemic banks that are deemed solvent, and 
a sovereign bankruptcy procedure involving private creditors in removing a 
 public debt overhang when a member country is clearly insolvent.
3.  The area-wide (federal) fiscal authority has a structural balanced budget in nor-
mal times allowing for modest spending to fulfil its tasks fully backed by its own 
tax revenues; it ensures that fiscal and structural policies are aligned across 
the union; and it manages a common stabilisation mechanism that issues the 
common sovereign bond (a synthetic instrument secured by a portfolio of sub-
sidiary government debt), provides the common fiscal backstop and implements 
the sovereign bankruptcy procedure.
4.  All subsidiary governments maintain a structural balanced budget for current 
spending; they can borrow for cost-effective capital expenditure11 and to capital-
ise the common stabilisation mechanism; their sovereign debt is rationed by the 
capital market and receives no preferential treatment in financial regulations. 
5.  Each subsidiary government has primary responsibility for its own economy; it 
can only draw on the common fiscal backstop to absorb exceptionally large 
asymmetric shocks and excessive financial market reactions and this temporary 
liquidity support is subject to strict policy conditions that effectively constrain 
their sovereignty; it can only request to activate the sovereign bankruptcy proce-
dure in exceptional cases subject to common agreement; a sovereign bail-out 
operation financed by area-wide (federal) institutions or other subsidiary govern-
ments to restore solvency is strictly forbidden.
These five characteristics emphasise that political institutions have an economic 
role to play in EMU by providing a balanced multi-level political system of rights 
and obligations that forms the basis for a well-functioning open and competitive 
11 This “golden rule” is taken from McKinnon (1995, 1997), but is not feasible in EMU because 
the Stability and Growth Pact and the Fiscal Compact demand a close to balanced overall 
budget or surplus in structural terms. 
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 internal market and for sound economic policies that foster sustainable convergence 
of the participating nation states.  
5.2  The need for political checks and balances
To make such a governance structure “self-enforcing”, so Qian and Weingast (1997), 
politicians must have credible incentives to honour the common rules of behaviour. 
As noted by McKinnon (1997) and Weingast (1995), under an unbalanced political 
system the central government may have too much discretionary authority to 
 promote its own interests by restricting economic freedom and reallocating income 
and wealth to the centre. This tendency to overwhelm the subsidiary governments 
could destroy the federal system and the stability of the common currency – unless 
a strong central bank takes countervailing measures. Or subsidiary governments 
may have too much scope to overspend by borrowing against the future, to overtax 
citizens in an arbitrary way, or to provide distortionary state aid to favoured local 
industries. This free-riding behaviour at the expense of other members would also 
undermine the federal system and may oblige the central bank to step in to safe-
guard the common currency. 
To solve these dilemmas of federalism, a proper balance of powers is required: 
the central government should have a sufficiently strong mandate to police free-
riding subsidiary authorities and align their economic policies. The subsidiary 
 governments in turn should be able to resist an encroaching central authority by tak-
ing  concerted action against abuses (Qian and Weingast, 1997, p. 90). A common 
 central bank and other union-wide bodies removed from direct political control 
(such as the judiciary) could in both cases tip the balance of this power struggle in 
favour of economic policy discipline as a precondition for a viable federal system 
and a stable currency.     
Montinola et al. (1995, p. 54) argue in this context that a market-preserving 
 federal system with the right political checks and balances between the central 
 government and subsidiary governments is superior to either complete centralisa-
tion with a unitary government or a complete decentralisation with each region 
 being an independent nation state. The reason for this superiority is that in both 
 alternative corner solutions the unitary government or the independent nation may 
retain the discretionary power to encroach on markets and abuse their central bank 
to devalue the currency or create inflation when it is looking for ways to circumvent 
its budget constraint. 
This analysis is also relevant for the ongoing discussions on the appropriate 
 degree of political integration in the euro area and the future of the euro as a  currency 
beyond the state: it suggests that a fully-fledged fiscal and political union may be 
neither desirable, nor necessary. For a sustainable EMU it could be sufficient to 
have effective common rules and autonomous supranational authorities (separate 
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from the ECB) for safeguarding and enforcing economic freedom and market 
 discipline, as well as a credible commitment of all national authorities concerned to 
coordinate their policies at the union level and to do whatever may be necessary for 
stabilising the euro (van Riet, 2015).12 This will still require a revision of the Lisbon 
Treaty to ensure that these supranational bodies have effective restraining powers 
and are made subject to democratic accountability and control.
The additional condition of democratic legitimacy relates to the “political 
 trilemma” put forward by Rodrik (2000, p.180; 2011, p.200). He highlights that any 
country wishing to participate in an integrated world economy has to make a choice: 
either give up national self-determination (replacing it by supranational decision-
making under democratic control), or forget about participatory democracy (replac-
ing it by a political system in which sovereign nation states delegate tasks related to 
the global economy to autonomous international institutions without democratic 
 legitimacy). 
Rodrik (2011, p. 218) sees Europe in this respect as “a half-way house”, as it 
combines deep regional economic integration among the sovereign Member States 
with an elaborate EU governance structure of many specialised agencies and few 
democratic institutions. Taking his analysis and focusing it more specifically on the 
euro area, the intermediate solution adopted for the political trilemma may be seen 
as another example of how its members are trying to “round the corners” of this 
 triangle, notably with regard to the role of the nation state and of democratic legiti-
macy, while aiming to meet the economic requirements for a successful participa-
tion in EMU (chart 6). 
On the one hand, as discussed further in section 5.3, the European leaders have 
established EU institutions with executive mandates to provide common public 
goods and services, promote sound public finances, and stabilise the financial 
 system. This EU governance framework of “executive federalism” (the expression 
used among others by Habermas, 2011) ensures that national policies are geared 
 towards facilitating mutual trade and capital mobility, concerted fiscal discipline 
and area-wide financial stability rather than towards serving narrow domestic inter-
ests. For this purpose, so Rodrik (2011), national regulations are either harmonised 
according to common standards or structured in such a way that they reduce trans-
action costs and pose “the least amount of hindrance” to economic integration. In 
addition, the discipline imposed both by EU surveillance and market forces makes 
national  policies compatible with euro area policies and the requirements for a  stable 
and  coherent monetary union. 
12 This is in line with the conclusion of the Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Group (2012, p. 5) that 
“the single currency requires as much fiscal federalism as necessary for its appropriate func-
tioning, but as little as possible”. See also Allard et al. (2013) for a discussion of the elements of 
a fiscal union that would be required as a minimum to make future euro area crises less severe. 
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On the other hand, the growing reach of “executive federalism” has narrowed 
the domain of national electoral influence. The Lisbon Treaty has therefore strength-
ened the political infrastructure at the European level, notably by giving greater 
powers to the European Parliament. Still, democratic legitimacy remains largely 
vested at the national level. The question remains how to make supranational 
 decision-makers more directly politically accountable for their actions, in particular 
as this also presupposes the existence of a social consensus among European  citizens 
(cf. Rodrik, 2000, pp. 182, 185; Rodrik, 2011, pp. 214–220; Habermas, 2011). 
Chart 6: The political trilemma of the euro area
Note:  To manage EMU, euro area countries have transferred specific common tasks to EU executive 
institutions that are subject to indirect democratic control at the national level rather than 
directly to the European Parliament.
5.3 The market-preserving rules and institutions of Europe
Europe has many supranational rules and institutions that provide the common 
 public goods and services that a viable monetary union requires and the recent sub-
stantial  upgrade of its governance framework should be instrumental in better align-
ing  national incentives with market-preserving behaviour. The authority of the Eu-
ropean Commission to police the EU internal market and that of the European Court 
of Justice to enforce competition law are well-established; they secure the cross-
border mobility of goods, services, capital and labour. The Single Market Acts of 
2011 and 2012 contain initiatives to further deepen the EU internal market. This EU 
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legislation followed the call in the Monti (2010) report for a new EU strategy to safe-
guard the single market against a revival of economic nationalism and to extend it to 
new areas. The envisaged creation of a capital markets union that further harmonises 
financial legislation and promotes the availability of non-bank sources of investment 
funding across Europe should also contribute to further integration. 
Since 2011, the newly established European System of Financial Supervision 
(comprising the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the three new  European 
Supervisory Authorities for banks, occupational pension funds and financial 
 markets) has been given the task to ensure efficient and harmonised macroprudential 
and microprudential regulation and supervision in Europe. Their aim is to  support 
financial stability and a sound financial system in the EU as a whole. 
The ECB is since 1999 in charge of the single monetary policy with an 
 independent mandate to maintain price stability in the euro area. Originally it was 
foreseen that it would only contribute to financial stability, because prudential 
 supervision remained a national responsibility. Since November 2014, however, the 
ECB has been mandated with new powers as the single supervisor of significant 
banks in the euro area and with final responsibility for the supervision of the smaller 
banks that will remain under national oversight. The ECB now also shares 
 responsibility for macroprudential supervision with the national authorities as coor-
dinated by the ESRB and it may decide to tighten (but not loosen) the macroprudential 
capital  buffers applied nationally to the banking sector when still seeing a risk of 
financial imbalances. This should remove a “home bias” in banking supervision and 
the risk that major banks could be pushed into investing in the sovereign bonds of 
their country of residence. Moreover, the separate Single Resolution Mechanism 
ensures that as from 2016 bank resolution will follow harmonised procedures. 
The Treaty enshrining the Fiscal Compact introduced as from 2014 a structural 
balanced budget rule in each contracting party’s national legislation, complementing 
the reinforced Stability and Growth Pact. A new EU surveillance procedure, which 
took effect in end-2011, aims to prevent and correct harmful macroeconomic 
 imbalances. As from mid-2013, euro area countries also face more intrusive supra-
national surveillance and stronger enforcement in the event that their macroeco-
nomic or fiscal policies would go astray. The newly established European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), capitalised by the euro area countries, provides a common  fiscal 
backstop for countries in liquidity stress, subject to strict policy conditions. Given 
an ESM assistance programme, the ECB might decide to undertake outright monetary 
transactions in a dysfunctional government bond market, if this was warranted for 
monetary policy reasons. As a “last resort”, the ESM may also directly inject capital 
in troubled banks, assuming that all other options including a private sector bail-in 
have been exhausted. Finally, as private investors will be aware, collective action 
clauses introduced in new sovereign bond contracts should in future facilitate in 
 exceptional cases an orderly public debt restructuring for insolvent countries. 
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5.4 The limits of half-way euro area political integration
Yet, this enhanced supranational economic and financial governance framework 
may be neither sufficient nor effective in countering (hidden) market repression and 
protectionism by euro area governments. Political economy arguments suggest that, 
as before, they might seek to escape market-based policy discipline and the “hard” 
budget constraint. As noted before, governments may respond to fiscal stress by 
 inducing a captive domestic investor base or react to an economic downturn by 
 imposing protectionist measures. The enforcement of the single market, the new 
banking union and the future capital markets union should mitigate these concerns, 
but it remains to be seen how effective they will be in countering financial protec-
tionism and imposing uniform laws governing securities markets.
Sapir and Wolff (2014) observe in this respect that “the single market is still far 
from reality in vital areas”, pointing to the Commission’s limited leverage over the 
largest EU Member States. Focusing on cross-border finance, the ESRB Advisory 
Scientific Committee (2014) argues that the application of EU competition policy to 
banks is only weak, which complicates the task of countering government tenden-
cies to nurture national banking champions and to protect them from foreign com-
petitors and take-overs.  
Dickson (2015) highlights that the ECB in its role as single bank supervisor 
works on creating a common supervisory culture across Europe characterised by a 
centrality of vision and absence of national bias. However, there is as yet no unified 
EU legal framework for banking supervision. This means that the ECB is  confronted 
with very diverse supervisory provisions and implementation practices at the 
 national level that create a significant margin of discretion and may interfere with 
the ECB’s supervisory competences. For example, national authorities can still issue 
binding prudential legislation that may hamper even conditions of bank competition 
and fragment the banking union. 
Posen and Véron (2014) conclude that Europe has established only “half a bank-
ing union”. There are lingering doubts over the remaining autonomy of national 
resolution authorities and the adequacy of ESM funds reserved for direct bank 
 recapitalisation. To complete the banking union, further steps will need to be taken 
to put in place a common fiscal backstop for the Single Resolution Fund as well as a 
European deposit insurance scheme. 
Furthermore, a supranational supervisor for institutional investors is still out of 
sight, despite their large cross-border financial activities. Also the national rules and 
supervisory bodies governing financial  market structures may still prevent uniform 
capital market conditions. Altogether this  suggests that banks, pension funds, insur-
ance companies and other financial intermediaries may still be vulnerable to moral 
suasion from national authorities to  invest more “at home”, such as in housing, en-
ergy, infrastructure, and in sovereign bonds.
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Moreover, the new national macroprudential authorities in the euro area may not 
yet fully internalise the spill-over effects of their policies on other member coun-
tries. As noted by Angeloni (2014), with central coordination still in its infancy, they 
could introduce a domestic dimension in their oversight of credit developments. 
This would distort the allocation of capital and undermine financial integration. Or 
they might take an overly lenient attitude towards signs of overheating and a large 
sovereign exposure, especially when the necessary measures are politically sensi-
tive. This could have negative consequences for economic and financial stability, 
both in their own country and in the euro area. 
Arellano et al. (2015) point to weaknesses in the EU legal framework for  creditor 
protection and enforcement of property rights, allowing considerable differences 
across countries. Member States have also retained the right to impose controls on 
capital movements on public policy grounds. This situation keeps foreign  investors 
alert to rising sovereign stress and the risk that governments might interfere with 
private contracts, freeze bank deposits and impose capital outflow restrictions that 
hinder private borrowers from servicing their external debt. As a result, any sover-
eign debt crisis is likely to spill over to the private sector and turn into an external 
debt crisis. 
Finally, Crafts (2013) warns that growing anti-European sentiments, rising euro 
scepticism and falling popular support for a free market economy could fuel protec-
tionist tendencies that damage the euro area’s growth prospects. 
5.5 The transformation to a more perfect monetary union
Following the negative scenario outlined by Pisani-Ferry et al. (2012), the unwill-
ingness of euro area countries to cede further sovereignty could – not only in a 
 crisis but also in normal times – cause a sustained fragmentation of financial and 
product markets and lead to a degeneration of EMU. Taking a more positive stance, 
Posen and Véron (2014) expect that the banking union, even when it is only half 
completed, will counter nationalist tendencies and have a positive transformational 
impact on the economic and financial structure of Europe. 
As part of this transformation, Trichet (2011) calls for setting up an EMU 
 treasury, with a balanced budget of moderate size. This central ministry of finance 
could be given the responsibility to align national fiscal policies in the euro areas’s 
interest, carry out surveillance of national economic policies and, when necessary 
in exceptional cases, enforce the prevailing rules of behaviour upon member coun-
tries. 
The EMU treasury could also be put in charge of managing the financial  support 
tools of the ESM designed for member countries that face temporary liquidity 
 constraints but are fundamentally solvent. For countries that have an unsustainable 
public debt it could activate a sovereign bankruptcy procedure involving private 
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creditors. Phasing in a statutory framework that opens the possibility of an orderly 
sovereign default inside EMU reinforces the credibility of the temporary and condi-
tional character of the fiscal backstop provided by the ESM. Moreover, it should be 
expected to increase market discipline on governments which is vital to preserve 
their “hard” budget constraint (Fuest et al., 2014; Deutsche Bundesbank, 2015).  
Brunnermeier et al. (2011) suggest introducing a “safe” common sovereign bond 
to anchor the financial system and mitigate destabilising cross-border capital flows 
within the euro area. The EMU treasury could be given a mandate for the ESM to 
issue a tranche of senior synthetic bonds backed by a maximised portfolio of  national 
sovereign bonds as well as a tranche of junior synthetic bonds that would carry the 
potential losses. To maintain a “hard” budget constraint for the participating coun-
tries, the preferential treatment of government bonds in EU prudential legislation 
that leads to an under-pricing of sovereign risk in the capital market could be gradu-
ally limited and carefully phased out (see also van Riet, 2013; Deutsche Bundes-
bank, 2015). 
Overall, a higher level of market-preserving fiscal federalism is warranted, i.e. a 
transfer of national sovereignty to the union level as necessary to secure the  cohesion 
and integrity of the euro area. To succeed, however, the principles of economic free-
dom and market discipline in EMU must be anchored in what Weingast (1995, p. 26) 
calls “a social consensus about the appropriate limits of the state” – or in the context 
of the euro area: about the responsibilities of sovereign nations participating in a 
monetary union. Such a consensus should lead citizens to withdraw their political 
support for a national government that violated these economic principles and 
 refuses to internalise the positive requirements of a welfare-enhancing EMU and 
the negative externalities of market-distorting policies for other members. The big-
gest challenge for the euro area may well be that of “finding a consensus on, and 
support for, new social contracts among national constituencies” that guide the 
 economic, financial and political transitions that are required to foster convergence 
towards an optimal currency area and ensure the long-term viability of the euro 
(Mongelli, 2013, p.7).
6  Conclusion: an imperfect monetary union may entrench 
fragmentation
This paper examined the role of markets and institutions in disciplining national 
policy makers and driving EMU towards an optimum currency area. European 
leaders introduced the euro as a political solution to the monetary policy trilemma 
known from the economic literature. They expected that this would offer them the 
triple benefits of a single market with a single currency and a single monetary 
 policy, i.e. a “holy trinity”. The price to pay was that national policy makers in 
 principle became subject to stronger market discipline. EU surveillance of compli-
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ance with the fiscal rules of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact 
complemented the market forces with peer pressure in support of sound public 
 finances. 
The euro crisis revealed the design flaws of EMU, showing that the area-wide 
control mechanisms to counter complacent national policies and protectionist 
 tendencies were too weak and that supranational authorities to control the financial 
 sector were needed as well as a “last resort” common rescue mechanism for liquid-
ity-stressed sovereigns and failing systemic banks. Moreover, capital markets had 
exercised  insufficient fiscal policy discipline before the crisis erupted. This appears 
at least partly due to the regulatory presumption that government bonds of all euro 
area countries were “safe”, which seemed to suggest a readiness of euro area part-
ners to support each other in times of fiscal stress and in effect undermined the 
credibility of the “no bail-out” clause. 
European leaders have responded to the euro crisis by putting in place an 
 enhanced economic and financial governance framework for the euro area. This 
should be more successful in aligning national incentives with EMU requirements 
and in preventing and  correcting unsound national policies, while providing for a 
common fiscal backstop if member countries nevertheless run into trouble. They 
also established the main pillars of a banking union and have taken first steps 
 towards a capital markets union. The question is whether these important but still 
half-way measures of political  integration, within the boundaries of the Lisbon 
Treaty, are sufficient to safeguard the cohesion and integrity of the euro area.
Governments have kept their national sovereignty in the field of macroeconomic 
and fiscal policies and may try to use this leeway to “round the corners” of the euro 
area’s monetary triangle, i.e. to circumvent the “hard” budget constraint and the 
strong market competition that they face in EMU. For example, high-debt govern-
ments may target more captive sovereign debt markets so as to reduce their expo-
sure to fickle foreign investors and volatile interest rates. Countries may ring-fence 
their national banking champions or put pressure on institutional investors in order 
to  secure access to credit for residents, including for the government itself. Or they 
may continue to shield strategic firms from foreign competition and take-overs or 
use state aid to subsidise favoured sectors. 
Those countries that applied such protectionist strategies during the euro crisis 
in effect turned inwards by promoting a renationalisation of policies and markets to 
facilitate their adjustment and deleveraging process. This economic nationalism 
may serve them well as a transitory stabilisation tool, but the longer it is sustained, 
the more it entrenches the fragmentation of the single market, which in turn 
 frustrates the single monetary policy and the efficient functioning of the European 
Monetary Union.  
To guarantee the cohesion and integrity of the euro area a higher level of 
 market-preserving fiscal federalism is warranted whereby European institutions 
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with a democratic mandate are empowered to ensure the alignment of national 
 policies with the requirements of EMU. This should prevent individual member 
countries from encroaching on markets and foster sustainable economic conver-
gence towards a more optimal currency area. Creating a fiscal union in a next step 
requires care to preserve fiscal discipline, because a powerful central government 
tends to enjoy a “soft” budget constraint and any budget transfers to subsidiary 
 governments would extend this public debt bias to the national level. 
Finally, more fiscal federalism along these lines also requires that the principles 
of economic freedom and market discipline are supported by a social consensus 
about the responsibilities of sovereign nations participating in a monetary union. 
The most important challenge of realising a welfare-enhancing EMU is to create 
national ownership for the economic, financial and political reforms necessary to 
secure the long-term viability of the euro. 
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